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For more than three decades after its inception in 1967, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was reluctant to institutionalize multilateral defense 
cooperation because it wanted to avoid becoming a military alliance or a defense pact. 
Instead, its members limited themselves to bilateral forms of defense cooperation with 
each other. However, at its 2003 Summit, ASEAN established the ASEAN Security 
Community (later changed to the ASEAN Political-Security Community), with a goal to 
enhance its defense cooperation to a multilateral scope. Why did the member states agree 
to this change? This thesis finds three reasons that ASEAN agreed to pursue multilateral 
defense cooperation. First, the main security challenges faced by ASEAN members had 
changed from traditional to non-traditional forms. These non-traditional threats are 
transnational in nature and difficult for a single state to solve. Second, in comparison to 
these threats, ASEAN members’ defense capabilities were large enough to make a 
difference. And third, mutual suspicions among these countries had declined over time, 
so they were more willing to cooperate with each other. Therefore, ASEAN established 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) for intramural interaction and the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) for external engagement. 
Through these arrangements, the members work together to achieve the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community. However, their cooperation remains limited to exercises 
against non-traditional security threats, and it seems unlikely that this new commitment 
to multilateral defense cooperation can be used in response to potential traditional 
security threats in the South China Sea or elsewhere in the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since its inception on August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has developed as a prominent, successful regional organization that aims to 
promote regional peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region.1 Although not literally 
stated in the Bangkok Declaration as a security organization, ASEAN has put regional 
security as its central objective. What was missing from the text of the Declaration—
which is mainly focused on economic, social, and cultural cooperation—was a 
commitment to security cooperation. Based on the circumstances and the official 
statements preceding the Declaration, security was needed as a required condition for 
development. ASEAN formation was a means to consolidate and solidify the 
relationships among members after several disputes or conflicts, such as Indonesia’s 
Konfrontasi (confrontation) towards Malaysia, and the dispute over Sabah between 
Malaysia and the Philippines. 
In ASEAN’s early years, however, the members’ desire to enhance regional 
security was not enough to drive them to formally approve multilateral security or 
defense cooperation. They preferred to limit security-related cooperation to a bilateral 
level. The primary reason was to prevent ASEAN from becoming a defense pact or 
military alliance. Another reason was that ASEAN members had weak military forces 
and could not help each other. 
ASEAN opposition to formal multilateral security cooperation first changed after 
the end of the Cold War. ASEAN created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 as 
a forum for dialogue about security. At this time, ASEAN still rejected multilateral and 
defense cooperation. 
1 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 19; Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a 
Mature Political and Security Community” (ADBI Working Paper No. 441), Asian Development Bank 
Institution (2013): 18, http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2013/10/28/
5917.asean.2030.political.security.community/. 
2 
The driving factor that enabled multilateral security cooperation within ASEAN 
was the change in the nature of the security challenges that it had faced since its 
inauguration. Until the end of the Cold War, the members’ main security threats were 
domestic, especially from communist and other insurgencies. Most of them did not face 
major external challenges.  
After the Cold War ended, which changed the security environment in Southeast 
Asia, ASEAN policy toward security cooperation also changed. The nature of security 
challenges has changed from traditional into non-traditional threats: from state to non-
state actors. Furthermore, the non-traditional security challenges are transnational in 
nature. They require broader-scale efforts rather than bilateral or unilateral ones. At the 
same time, some Southeast Asian countries had successfully overcome communist 
insurgencies and relatively achieved stable national development—primarily economic. 
Those conditions provided the members of ASEAN an opportunity to redefine their 
policy and approach to the security challenges and their view on the ASEAN strategic 
role in maintaining peace and stability of the region. 
In 2003, ASEAN leaders finally decided to expand security cooperation to include 
military and defense cooperation, not just dialogue about security. At a summit meeting 
that year, they agreed to a broader goal of creating an ASEAN Community, which would 
have three pillars. One of these would be the ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation 
(APSC). Examining the development of ASEAN policy towards security and defense 
cooperation brings up the question that is answered by this thesis: why did ASEAN 
leaders decide in 2003 to enhance defense cooperation, but not in in 1967 when ASEAN 
was created? As discussed already in the preceding paragraphs, this thesis is based on the 
premise that the emergence of new security challenges drives ASEAN to change its 
approach to security and defense cooperation. This thesis examines the nature of security 
challenges before and after the Cold War. It also examines security and defense 
cooperation within ASEAN prior to and since 2003, when the members agreed to create 
the APSC, which will officially be launched at the end of 2015. 
3 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Scholars have debated ASEAN’s role and contribution to regional peace and 
stability as it is described in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Some optimistically argue 
that ASEAN has made many efforts to prevent conflicts and manage existing disputes 
among its members. Others pessimistically assert that ASEAN only conducts talks and 
negotiations without taking any real measures. Though the ASEAN Community has not 
yet been established, it is interesting to explore the reasons for the APSC becoming one 
of ASEAN Community’s pillars. Under APSC, endorsing and enhancing defense 
cooperation through military engagement is evidence to support the argument that 
ASEAN has changed its approach to security. Through the ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-plus (which includes eight non-ASEAN countries), 
ASEAN members have hosted various military exercises to address potential security 
challenges, which is very different from what ASEAN did in the past. These changes 
suggest that concrete, effective, and large-scale defense cooperation is more possible 
today than before, and may become even more possible in the future. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the literature on the three pertinent areas that are essential to 
the thesis: the definition of a security community and defense cooperation, the nature of 
security challenges, and the development of ASEAN defense cooperation. Defining 
security community and defense cooperation facilitates the development of the 
conceptual framework for understanding the factors involved in forming the community. 
As described in the previous section, the changing nature of security threats contributes to 
the need to widen the area of cooperation within ASEAN. In relation to the security 
challenges, defense capability is one of the factors that drives member states’ decisions to 
participate or not in the cooperation framework. In line with the security challenges, 
defense cooperation among members has also increased from bilateral to multilateral 
scope. 
 4 
1. Defining Security Community and Defense Cooperation 
Many scholars, such as Karl Deutsch, have defined a security community based 
on a Western European standpoint derived from the foundation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Amitav Acharya, among others, has adopted and applied 
that definition to explain a security cooperation framework in the ASEAN context. He 
asserts that “a security community is distinguished by a ‘real assurance that the members 
of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way.’”2 There are two types of security communities: the amalgamated and 
the pluralistic. Rather than amalgamated, which requires binding political obligation, as 
seen in NATO, Acharya uses the pluralistic characteristic of a security community to 
characterize ASEAN; this type of community allows members to retain their 
independence and sovereignty, which is a primary concern for the developing countries 
that are a part of ASEAN.3 This is reflected in the principle of non-interference. A 
pluralistic security community is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states 
whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”4 This definition, 
according to Acharya, contains two prominent features: “the absence of war” and war 
planning against other members. It does not mean that there are no conflicts of interest or 
differences among them, but it means that they can manage and prevent their 
dissimilarities peacefully. This is the characteristic that makes a security community 
distinct from other forms of security cooperation.5 
Adopting the same principle, Donald K. Emerson came to a new definition of a 
pluralistic security community that he sees as suitable for the ASEAN context as well: “A 
pluralistic security community … is simply a group of sovereign states that share both an 
                                                 
2 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 





expectation of intramural security and a sense of intramural community.”6 Separately, he 
defines security as “the presence of a durable peace among these [member] states, 
reflecting a lasting prior absence of war among them”7 and community as “the presence 
of a cooperative identity among these [member] states, including a commitment to 
abstain from using force against each other.”8 Emerson then stresses that “the more 
pluralistic the security community, the more sovereign its members.”9
As stated in its blueprint, the APSC is a means for ASEAN members “to achieve 
ASEAN’s goals in the political and security fields.”10 The APSC is based on the concept 
of comprehensive security, which takes into account the close relationship of political, 
economic, social-cultural, and environmental dimensions of development. It reiterates the 
rejection of aggression and the use of force for dispute resolution.11 This principle fits 
with Acharya and Emmerson’s features of a security community as described previously: 
the absence of war and the ability to solve conflict with peaceful means. Furthermore, to 
preserve and enhance peace and stability in the region, “the APSC seeks to strengthen the 
mutually beneficial relations between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners and friends.”12 
Defense cooperation is one of the common concerns that needs to be improved to 
achieve the goals of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. Defense cooperation is 
the process of working together in defense-related areas. The actor is primarily armed 
forces, and the aim is to build and maintain security. The term is literally stated in the 
Bali Concord II:  
ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to 
discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters 
6 Donald K. Emmerson, “Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing 





10 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 




of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security 
cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation among ASEAN 
countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and 
resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means.13  
In this regard, according to Rodolfo C. Severino, a former secretary general of ASEAN, 
the Association must establish a forum for defense officials or related ministers with two 
functions: to identify areas of defense cooperation and to serve a “consultative and 
confidence-building purpose.”14 He then argues that defense cooperation in ASEAN is 
far from being a defense pact or military alliance per se since there are some differences 
in views, capabilities, and circumstances among members. This step, however, 
demonstrates significant change in the ASEAN perspective over the multilateral defense 
cooperation that it has long avoided.15 
2. The Nature of Security Challenges
In its inception, all the first five members of ASEAN faced and shared common 
challenges of internal threats, according to Michael Leifer, which were also influenced by 
the external circumstance.16 The communist ideology, among others, had been the 
prominent threat for countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Leifer also asserted that the 
basic consensus among governments was that their common threat was derived only from 
internal subversion or insurgency, which mainly occurred because of economic 
deprivation. Promoting economic development was considered a means to counter and 
solve the internal threats.17 Therefore, focusing on economic cooperation within ASEAN 
was a more logical approach than focusing on security or defense cooperation. 
ASEAN countries had to face potential external challenges as a result of the Cold 
War and conflict among non-member countries—Vietnam and Cambodia. The Cambodia 
13 “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II),” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
October 7, 2003, http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii. 
14 Rodolfo C. Severino, Towards an ASEAN Security Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2004), 15. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 
1. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
7 
invasion by Vietnam had triggered ASEAN to redefine its security policy to assume a 
regional security role.18 The conflict, for example, had posed a threat to Thailand when 
Vietnamese troops were sent to its border. To directly address those challenges, the Thai 
government required adequate military forces that might have been obtained from other 
ASEAN members; however, mainly due to their lack of defense capability, they did not 
provide physical military support to Thailand. The association was only able to provide 
diplomatic and political support for peaceful conflict resolution. Furthermore, according 
to Acharya, “the military weakness of the individual ASEAN states, which made them 
dependent on Western security guarantees, also undermined the deterrent value of any 
intra-ASEAN security commitments.”19 
The end of the Cold War stopped the communist threat, but it destabilized 
regional security in Southeast Asia following the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from the 
region. As Noel M. Morada identified, ASEAN faced several security concerns in the 
early post–Cold War period, including “the issue of U.S. involvement in the region along 
with the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea, instability on the Korean 
Peninsula, nuclear proliferation, and the gradual expansion of ASEAN membership.”20 
This was the reason for ASEAN to start recalculating its security approach. Although 
there had been some proposals, ASEAN began deeply thinking in 1992 about the creation 
of an ASEAN-led security forum that would include not just ASEAN members but also 
its dialogue partners and some non-dialogue states. Finally, in 1994, ASEAN launched 
the ARF, which was the first and only multilateral security forum in the region.21 As a 
means to manage uncertainty, another important objective of the ARF was to manage the 
potential rivalry among existing and emerging major powers. In other words, ASEAN 
intended to enmesh the major powers—China, Japan, and United States—through the 
18 Ibid., 10. 
19 Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence 
Community’?,” Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (1991): 162, doi:10.2307/2759957. 
20 Noel M. Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Origins and Evolution,” in Cooperative Security 
In the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 14–15. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
8 
ARF.22 The ARF, however, was only a mechanism for security discussion among foreign 
ministry officials.23 Defense and military officials had no official role in the ARF until 
2002 when the Forum established the ARF Defense Dialogue and the ARF Security 
Policy Conference to include those officials.24 
By the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Southeast Asian countries had to 
deal with the rise of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges, defined as “challenges to 
the survival and well-being of peoples and states which arise primarily out of non-
military sources, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular 
migration, food shortages, smuggling of persons, drug trafficking, and other forms of 
transnational crimes.”25 Those challenges are complex in nature, as Mely Caballero-
Anthony describes; they are “transnational in scope, unprompted, rapidly transmitted, 
hardly prevented by national solution but manageable through regional and multilateral 
cooperation, and human security becomes central.”26 ASEAN had struggled to mitigate 
and solve the risk of NTS challenges, such as infectious diseases (SARS, Avian Flu, and 
HIV/AIDS); environmental degradations (the pollutant haze since 1997 that was caused 
by forests fires); natural disasters (Aceh’s Tsunami in 2004 and several typhoons that 
periodically hit the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia); and maritime security 
issues, such as combatting piracy in the Malacca Straits. 
As stated in the APSC Blueprint, “A key purpose of ASEAN is to respond 
effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive 
security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and trans-boundary challenges.”27 
Departing from the statement, the ASEAN concept has altered from state-actor references 
22 Ibid., 18. 
23 Sheldon W. Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security 
Studies, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (London; New York: Routledge, 
2010), 302. 
24 Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” 26. 
25 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges,” Regional Governance, and the 
ASEAN Political Security Community (ASPC),” in ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, ed. 
Ralf Emmers (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 27. 
26 Ibid. 
27 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 12. 
 9 
to human security, which includes individuals and societies.28 The important notion is 
that the NTS challenges, although difficult, are manageable through cooperation, so they 
require less defense capability to counter than traditional security threats do. Departing 
from this consideration, the change from traditional to non-traditional security concerns is 
seen as a driving factor to institutionalize a multilateral security community within 
ASEAN. 
3. The Development of ASEAN Defense Cooperation 
Shifting to a multilateral approach in security and defense cooperation has long 
been avoided in ASEAN. Although many attempts were made to promote the new idea of 
defense cooperation as a response to Cold War–era security challenges, none of the 
proposals earned support from the majority of ASEAN leaders. According to Acharya, 
“the goal of creating security not only assumed priority over a military pact, but the latter 
was considered subversive of the former.”29 In the first decade of ASEAN, the sources of 
interstate conflict in the region—which were intimately connected to domestic political 
stability—made a military pact irrelevant since its purpose was mainly to counter external 
military attacks.30 
In this regard, ASEAN members initially formed and developed their defense 
cooperation bilaterally. Addressing the cross-border insurgency issue with border security 
arrangements was the first model of defense cooperation, and, after the communist 
collapse, it expanded to other areas such as “intelligence sharing, joint exercises and 
training, which have greater utility against conventional military threat.”31 Another form 
of defense cooperation that was perceived as a minimalist approach to ASEAN defense 
cooperation was arms manufacturing and equipment standardization with the prospect of 
a regional self-sufficient defense industry.32 Nevertheless, the possibility to operate under 
                                                 
28 Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges,” 33. 
29 Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 161. 
30 Ibid., 162. 
31 Ibid., 164. 
32 Ibid., 169. 
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this arrangement was small because of the wide gap in the defense industry capacity 
among members. 
The development of security cooperation is interconnected with the idea of 
regionalism. The primary factors that motivated ASEAN member states to avoid a 
military alliance, according to Acharya, were the desire to not provoke the states involved 
in the Vietnam conflict and the availability of an external security guarantor.33 The first 
factor related to the Vietnamese view towards ASEAN as an extension of the Western 
security framework. Thus, creating such a defense or military pact would likely trigger 
other Great Powers—the Soviet Union and China—to react, thereby amplifying the 
security tension in the region. It was impossible, of course, to seek security support from 
neighboring countries to deter a spillover communist threat since they had limited 
defense capabilities as well. Therefore, most of the Southeast Asian countries relied upon 
Western states.34 When the security provider faded, ASEAN needed another approach to 
address internal and external challenges. 
Since 1996, ASEAN defense officials have participated in the ASEAN security 
dialogues. In addition, several types of multilateral defense cooperation have been 
established outside the ASEAN framework, namely, ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces 
Meeting (or Chiefs of Staff) in 2002, ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting in 
2000, ASEAN Navy Interaction in 2001, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference in 2004, 
ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in 2003, and ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet in 1991. 
In 2006, ASEAN members agreed to form the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting 
(ADMM)—the highest defense consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN—to 
provide an official forum to “promote mutual trust and confidence through greater 
understanding of defense and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency 
and openness.”35 The scope of defense cooperation has developed in many areas, as also 
stated in the APSC Blueprint, including maritime security, Humanitarian Assistance and 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 163. 
34 Ibid., 162. 
35 ASEAN Secretariat, “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting,” Association of Southeast Asia Nations, accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.asean.org/news/
item/concept-paper-for-the-establishment-of-an-asean-defence-ministers-meeting-2. 
11 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), terrorism, contagious diseases, and so on. Examining this 
pattern in which the characteristics of security challenges have changed, it is reasonable 
for ASEAN to enhance its defense cooperation from merely bilateral to more regional 
and multilateral scope. The formation of ADMM-Plus in 2010 reflected another new 
significant step in ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The reasons that ASEAN agreed to enhance its defense cooperation under the 
APSC are the change of security challenges, the increase of defense capability relative to 
the threats, and the success of ASEAN in avoiding intramural military conflicts. The 
change in the nature of security challenges from traditional to non-traditional seems to be 
the primary factor in the formation of the ASEAN security community. Non-traditional 
threats, with their transnational nature and human security–related concerns, require less 
capability to address challenges than state actor threats. Although the source of non-
traditional threats may be from one of the ASEAN members, this source is more unlikely 
to trigger a conflict with neighboring countries. Furthermore, ASEAN has had sufficient 
experience in managing conflicts between its members. It gives more room for ASEAN 
members to cooperate in the defense field. Piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, 
environmental issues, and natural disasters, among other things, are non-traditional 
security challenges that require the cooperation of states to address the threats. Despite 
existing disputes in the region, the attainment of relative peaceful and stable region since 
its inception through a comprehensive security approach has also motivated ASEAN to 
continuously enhance its defense cooperation. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In conducting my research, I study three variables that influenced ASEAN 
members’ decision to form the APSC—the nature of security challenges, the defense 
capability, and the ability to prevent conflict among members; the goal is to find the 
patterns of those variables. I examine and compare security challenges that ASEAN faced 
since its inception in two significant periods of time: the Cold War era, when ASEAN 
faced mostly traditional security challenges, and the time after the end of the Cold War, 
12 
when ASEAN encountered mostly non-traditional threats. The comparison of security 
challenges sheds light on the different levels of threat to the peace and stability of the 
region, as well as of every member state, and the level of defense capability required to 
address the challenges. 
The research analyzes how ASEAN addressed those security challenges through 
defense cooperation. The purpose of this analysis is to find out what approaches they 
used—bilateral or multilateral, whether they were successful or failed, and which factors 
might affect the approach to address the security challenges. For this research, I use 
several case studies of conflict resolution efforts by ASEAN and its members. 
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II. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND 
ASEAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the Bangkok Declaration, promoting regional peace and stability is 
one of ASEAN’s aims and purposes.36 To achieve this aim, the association has to ensure 
that all security challenges are addressed appropriately. The declaration also implicitly 
articulates the need to conduct collective efforts to maintain order in the region “through 
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the 
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”37 The security 
problems in Southeast Asia come from three sources: domestic, regional, and external.38 
In addition, Alice D. Ba includes transnational issues in this category.39 Moreover, Ba 
points out that, in ASEAN, the “sources of insecurity are wide-ranging and typically 
include regime survival, economic and political stability, internal insurgences, and also 
more conventional concern about foreign intervention and interference.”40 Domestic, or 
internal, security threats are established in the form of rebellion groups or freedom 
movements and typically challenge the legitimacy of governing regimes in a state. 
Regional, or intramural, problems are related to the dispute between two countries in the 
region. External sources of security issues emanate from outside actors’ influence and 
may potentially create instability within the region. 
These sources of predicaments are inter-connected and influence each other. The 
impact of a domestic security issue in one country may spill over into others and create 
                                                 
36 “The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967,” Association of Southeast 
Asia Nations, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-
declaration. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 10, 16.  
39 Alice D. Ba, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian 
Security Studies, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 206.  
40 Ibid., 205–6. 
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tensions between them.41 Conversely, a regional conflict may affect domestic conditions 
in a country within the region. External influences come into play and shape the region 
and countries within domestically.42 This type of relationship can occur as the result of 
interactions among states, and globalization accelerates the dynamics of their behaviors 
towards each other. 
Among the domestic, regional, and external sources of security issues in the 
region, the external factor is the most influential in the security environment of Southeast 
Asia; this factor shaped the perception of threat and the policies of ASEAN members to 
address the security challenges that endanger peace and stability of the region. Most 
scholars of Southeast Asia agree that the prominent external factor was the Cold War.43 
According to Acharya, there were two Cold Wars in Southeast Asia: “the East-West [the 
U.S. alliance versus the Soviet Unions’ coalitions] and the East-East (Sino-Soviet) 
rivalries.”44 These wars reflected the involvement of the great powers—the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and China—in the region that made domestic conflicts expand 
into global issues such as the Vietnam War and agitated regional disputes in the case of 
Cambodia.45 This power competition strongly influenced most of the governments in the 
region as they formulated their foreign policies, which directly contributed to their 
security policy stances within ASEAN as well as their political positions toward regional 
conflict among countries in Southeast Asia. 
As ASEAN was born in the Cold War era, Tommy Koh characterizes its 
foundation as “born in the challenging time,” because it had to directly face several 
serious issues at the same time.46 Moreover, Acharya asserts that the Cold War order 
41 Amitav Acharya, ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community 
(Tokyo: Asian Development Bank, 2013), 12, http://www.adb.org/publications/asean-2030-challenges-
building-mature-political-and-security-community. 
42 Amitav Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-
Pacific (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002), 132. 
43 Ibid., 126. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Yoong Yoong Lee, ASEAN Matters: Reflecting on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific., 2011), i, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10493524. 
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encouraged the creation of ASEAN as a sub-regional community.47 The association 
illustrated the common idea of founding states taking a position against superpower 
rivalry. Therefore, the demise of the Cold War brought a new dimension of regional 
order.  
After the Cold War and along with economic development in the region, some 
internal threats in ASEAN countries were significantly reduced because some rebellions 
and separatist movements halted their activities. The countries still had to face the 
security impact of the China’s territorial claim in the South China Sea, however. In 
addition, in this era of globalization, ASEAN members recognized the emergence of non-
traditional security challenges ranging from transnational crimes—such as terrorism, 
piracy, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal immigrants—environmental degradation, 
contagious diseases, natural disasters, to cyber security, and so on that are transnational in 
nature. 
This chapter seeks to identify the development of the security environment and 
the challenges ASEAN has encountered from its inception to the present day. The Cold 
War is employed as the variable framework to demarcate and compare the characteristics 
of security challenges. The following sections describe the security environment and 
challenges during the Cold War and in the post–Cold War period. 
B. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE COLD 
WAR ERA 
When it was created, as Koh has pointed out, ASEAN and its members, had to 
immediately deal with a complex, challenging situation brought by the Cold War, which 
also complicated the existing security challenges they faced. While struggling to 
overcome domestic challenges, Southeast Asian countries had to begin dealing with 
regional problems such as territorial disputes and conflicts among Indochinese countries. 
In the early years after the association was formed, the first five members of ASEAN—
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—were striving to develop 
47 Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism, 132. 
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their nations. At the same time, conflicts among them over territorial claims tested their 
cohesion and the survival of the association. 
1. Domestic Security Challenges
According to Alan Collins, countries in the region, having been under colonial 
rule (except Thailand) and having encountered communist insurgencies, were “at the 
early stage of state making and nation building.”48 The first led to the effort to obtain 
regime legitimacy from the people, and the latter related to the national identity.49 To 
achieve these two efforts, governments in Southeast Asia confronted resistance from 
separatist groups and ethnic conflicts. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, for example, 
had experienced such challenges. To suppress those oppositions, the governing regimes 
mainly used violent measures through military operations. According to Collins, coercive 
action was the only capable, adequate means available to the elites.50 Military action as a 
solution, however, did not always successfully overcome the problem. Therefore, 
understanding the root cause of rebellions can help to build a proper strategy to 
comprehensively solve these internal challenges. 
The background of internal conflict in Southeast Asia, according to Acharya, is 
ethnic and political.51 Based on Southeast Asian indigenous characteristics, which have 
broad ethnic, cultural, and language differences, Acharya argues that one of the sources 
of internal conflict in ASEAN was the attempt to accommodate the diverse groups of 
people in a single, solid state.52 To achieve this goal, a government requires a strong 
legitimacy. It has to establish a political system to exercise its authority. Most of the 
countries in the region implemented an authoritarian type of governance. Acharya points 
out that changing or removing authoritarian regimes from power was another reason that 
separatist groups undertook their movements.53 The ethnic tension in Myanmar 
48 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 11. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
50 Ibid., 13. 
51 Acharya, ASEAN 2030, 11. 
52 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 11. 
53 Acharya, ASEAN 2030, 11. 
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exemplified this argument. The tension started when Burman ethnics, the largest 
population, dominated the central government and proposed the incorporation of other 
ethnic minorities—the Karen, Shan, Araknese, Kachin, Chin, and Mon—into the Burman 
population. These ethnic minorities rejected the proposal because it would remove their 
identity and initiated an armed struggle against the central government, which met the 
opposition with a military approach.54 The fighting continued until early 2000 when 
elites began an initiative of national reconciliation, which culminated in the release of the 
leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, in 2002.55 
Together with the ethnic and political reasons, economic disparity, religion, and 
ideology were also motivating factors for rebellions to demand autonomy or freedom 
from existing nations. Indonesia experienced this when it had to deal with three separatist 
groups: the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), or the Free Papua Movement; the 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or the Aceh Freedom Movement; and the FRETILIN in 
East Timor (which became Timor Leste after obtaining independence). All of these 
movements demanded independence. Although Indonesia defined itself as a multi-ethnic 
country, officials in the central government in Jakarta were dominated by Javanese. This 
condition created a negative perception of Javanese and introduced the term 
Javanization.56 In addition, the transmigration program exaggerated this negative 
impression.57 Although the program had positive goals of reducing the population in Java 
Island and distributing economic development, local communities had a different 
interpretation. They saw the arrival of Javanese in their homes as an invasion. Collins 
calls this “internal colonialism.”58 
                                                 
54 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 27. 
55 Ibid., 34.; an attribution to characterize the domination of Javanese officials in the central 
government and a connotation of a transmigration program. 
56 Ibid. 
57 This was a program during Suharto’s tenure to evenly distribute dense populations in a region and 
to prevent Java island from becoming overpopulated—by moving Javanese to low-density islands: 
Kalimantan, Sumatera, Papua, and Sulawesi. 
58 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 36. 
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Besides the negative perception on the transmigration, Aceh’s resentment toward 
Jakarta occurred because of economic growth distribution and military activities. Aceh 
obtained only a small benefit from the economic development program implementation 
compared to what it had contributed to the Indonesian government. As it has had 
abundant natural gas and oil, Aceh has been among the largest revenue contributors for 
Indonesia’s economy. A similar case happened to the West Papua, where its natural 
resources—copper and gold—had been exploited with little compensation and benefit for 
the local government and people.59 Human rights violations by military personnel during 
the separatist suppressing missions upset the local people and triggered them to continue 
their struggle against Jakarta.60 The violent treatment of rebel groups in Myanmar had a 
similar outcome.61 Hence, considering the factors that led to the domestic challenges, the 
economic development approach would have been more appropriate than a military one. 
2. Regional and External Security Challenges
In the regional scope, the old conflicts among Southeast Asian nations—and 
among the founding members, in particular—still challenged ASEAN’s cohesiveness and 
created tensions during the Cold War era. Some of those regional tensions were related to 
territorial disputes and border security issues. Although several border disputes had been 
settled via bilateral agreement, the North Borneo/Sabah claim between Malaysia and 
Philippines, the execution of Indonesian marines by Singapore, racial tensions following 
Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, and bilateral tension between Myanmar and 
Thailand over “ethnic insurgencies and security policies, illegal fishing, and drug 
production and trafficking” were among other issues that the association members had to 
deal with.62 These problems had the potential to escalate the existing frictions among 
them. 
59 Ibid., 43, 47. 
60 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 39; ibid., 43, 47. 
61 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 32. 
62 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 207; Narayanan Ganesan, “Bilateral Tension in 
ASEAN,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and 
Joseph Chinyong Liow (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 218. 
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The Vietnam invasion into Cambodia in 1978 was the most influential conflict in 
Southeast Asia that challenged ASEAN’s effort to promote and maintain the peace and 
stability of the region and to uphold the principles of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The invasion followed the communist victory over the Western 
powers in Indochina after the South won the Vietnam War and the Hanoi treaty between 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 1978. The Cambodian conflict, according to Mely 
Caballero-Anthony, brought up two security problems for ASEAN: the security of 
Thailand and the continuing communist influence.63 The first concern was related to the 
border between Thailand and Cambodia and the historical rivalry between Vietnam and 
Thailand; the latter heightened ASEAN’s anxiety toward Moscow’s effort to strengthen 
its presence in the region, which could potentially invite more heated tensions of a 
superpower rivalry.64 To address this challenge, ASEAN had three options: military 
support; political, diplomatic, and economic isolation against Vietnam; and a political 
settlement proposal.65 Among the three, ASEAN successfully brought the conflict to a 
peaceful resolution through a comprehensive political settlement.66 Overall, the border-
related issues and the involvement of great powers in the region shaped regional security 
challenges in the Cold War era. 
C. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THE COLD 
WAR 
Vietnam’s military withdrawal from Cambodia, followed by the fall of the Soviet 
Union, marked the end of the Cold War and its influence in Southeast Asia. Moscow’s 
military retreat from the region diminished the tension between superpowers. This 
development also fulfilled ASEAN’s desire to make the region free from the great power 
intervention, as stated in the ZOPFAN. The situation, however, also created new 
dimensions of security challenges. The absence of a power balance after the Soviets left 
the region offered opportunities to other major powers, such as China, Japan, and the 
63 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia, 86–87. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 87. 
66 Ibid., 106. 
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United States, to set their influences and their new roles in the region.67 Alice D. Ba 
observes that the growing influence of China, and increasing pressures on human rights 
issues in the region, urged regional states to respond appropriately in pursuing the idea of 
“One Southeast Asia.”68  
Moreover, as a followed-up response to the end of the Cold War and U.S. policy 
changes, the United States closed its military bases in the Philippines. For ASEAN, this 
step altered the balance of power in the region and created an opportunity for middle 
powers in the region to move in. To address these challenges, according to David B. H. 
Denoon and Evelyn Colbert, “ASEAN undertook to enlarge its membership, to expand its 
Asia-Pacific role through the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [in 1994], 
and to seek economic integration—the ASEAN Regional Free Trade Area (AFTA) [in 
1992].”69 In addition, as Ba points out, the global, external development in economic and 
security affairs changed ASEAN perspective of its former role orientation, from domestic 
and intramural into global scope.70  
Simon S. C. Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao identified three trends after the economic 
crisis in 1997 that arguably brought new challenges to ASEAN: “democracy, economic 
openness, and development and security.”71 While democracy promises better conditions 
for development, countries’ responses to democratization in Southeast Asia were diverse. 
Transforming into democratic systems has not been an easy process in the region since 
most of the countries have exercised soft authoritarian models. Indonesia’s dramatic 
change was an example of the difficulty of this transition: Suharto’s authoritarian regime 
gave up its power after a tragic, massive, bloody demonstration in May 1998. While 
economic crisis brought the region into deeper economic cooperation, competition among 
67 David B. H. Denoon and Evelyn Colbert, “Challenges for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN),” Pacific Affairs 71, no. 4 (1998): 508, doi:10.2307/2761082. 
68 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 209. 
69 Denoon and Colbert, “Challenges for the Association,” 508–9. 
70 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 209. 
71 Simon Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao, “The Relevance of ASEAN: Crisis and Change,” in Reinventing 
ASEAN, ed. Simon Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001), 5. 
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the countries was inevitable. In addition, security challenges also increased due to the 
increase of economic activities such as trading, commodities distribution, transportation, 
and so on, which increase the potential for illegal and criminal activities. Furthermore, 
threats to human security increased as well since development has created better welfare 
but social and environmental degradation.  
The membership expansion of ASEAN was also another factor that changed the 
strategic political environment of Southeast Asia. The retreat of Vietnam troops from 
Cambodia following the end of the Cold War as the result of the Soviet Unions’ fall 
brought new direction for ASEAN members’ policy toward Indochinese countries—
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodian—and vice versa. When ASEAN was founded, those 
countries, particularly Vietnam, perceived the association as “part of an American policy 
containment,” as Ralf Emmers observes.72 Led by Hanoi, they persistently refused the 
invitation from ASEAN to attend its meeting as an observer and complained about the 
concept of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and ZOPFAN.73 Reciprocally, 
Vietnam’s invasion to Cambodia amplified the existing ASEAN members’ caution 
toward communist expansion efforts, and the association saw the annexation as a 
violation of the TAC. The resolution of the Cambodian conflict and domestic economic 
considerations urged ASEAN and Indochinese states to reconcile their relationship, and 
the result was that Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were accepted as new 
members. According to Emmers, the acceptance of the Indochinese countries brought at 
least three security and diplomatic benefits to the countries: regional and international 
recognition, intramural conflict avoidance and management, and assistance for 
diplomatic efforts.74 
The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN, however, also created more security 
issues for the association to manage. Vietnam brought its existing territorial dispute with 
China over Spratly and Paracels islands into several ASEAN’s meetings to obtain support 
72Ralf Emmers, “The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 1 (March 2005): 72, doi:10.1080/
1035771042000332057. 
73Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 75–76. 
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from other members. This effort exaggerated the complexity for the association to 
manage the South China Sea disputes. In addition, the Thailand–Laos border conflict in 
September 2000 and the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January 2003 increased the 
vulnerability of bilateral ties and regional tension.75 
Along with this development, China has emerged as a new major power in the 
region and started to propagate its influence and assertiveness. It again triggered existing 
tension with regard to the South China Sea dispute when it submitted its infamous “9-
dash line” map to the United Nations in 2009 to indicate its claim over the area.76 The 
dispute in the South China Sea began attracting the association’s attention in 1992 when 
Vietnam and China quarreled over oil exploration.77 China’s first aggressive move was 
its military occupation over the Mischief Reef, which was claimed by the Philippines.78 
Recently, China has maintained and increased its continuous efforts to obtain legitimacy 
over its claim by starting reclamation and physical construction in several islands and 
rocks and placing some military assets.79 China’s incessant assertiveness in the South 
China Sea could potentially lead to a military clash among the claimants. This 
development has driven ASEAN to establish policy and efforts to manage the conflict 
through several diplomatic meetings.80  
Furthermore, while dealing with the traditional state-to-state conflicts, the 
countries in Southeast Asia have also had to deal recently with the emergence of non-
traditional security challenges such as piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, 
environmental issues, contagious diseases, human rights violence, natural disasters, and 
so on. Some of these are described in more detail in the following section. These types of 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 84–85. 
76 “China’s Infamous ‘9 Dash Line’ Map,” EnerGeoPolitics, November 26, 2012, 
http://energeopolitics.com/2012/11/26/chinas-infamous-9-dash-line-map/. 
77 Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” The SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 76. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Katie Hunt and Vivian Kam, “China: South China Sea Island Building ‘Almost Complete,’” CNN, 
accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/17/asia/china-south-china-sea-land-reclamation/
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80 Thayer, “ASEAN, China,” 77. 
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security challenge are more complex because they are transnational in nature and have 
non-state-actor characteristics. Therefore, addressing those predicaments requires a 
cooperative strategy and transnational efforts from the surrounding countries. 
1. Domestic Security Issues  
While facing pressure from global security challenges, Southeast Asian countries 
also had to deal with existing domestic turbulence from non-communist separatist 
movements. Although communist insurgencies declined due to the decrease of external 
communist power supports, governments in the region still encountered freedom 
movements that consumed their energy and resources. The Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and the FRETILIN kept Indonesian political 
and military elites occupied in seeking a holistic solution to halt the progress of these 
movements. In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front remain active. The Pattani United Liberation Organization in Southern 
Thailand continues its fight for freedom and recognition.81 Tables 1 and 2 illustrate 
selected communist rebellion and separatist movements in Southeast Asia. 
  
                                                 
81 M. Santoso E. Nugroho, “ASEAN and Security in Southeast Asia” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1994), 48, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42846. 
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Table 1.   Selected Communist Movements and Parties in Southeast Asia, 
1946–1976 
Country Movement 
Myanmar Burma Communist Party (1948–) 
Cambodia Khmer Rouge (1970–75) 
Indonesia Madiun Communist Rebellion (1948) 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (1965) 
Laos Pathet Lao (1951–75) 
Malaysia Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) (1948–) 
North Kalimantan Communist Party (1950s-) 
Philippines New People’s Army (1969–) 
Huk Rebellion (1946–54) 
Singapore none (The CPM operated in Singapore before 
its separation from Malaysia in 1965) 
Thailand Communist Party of Thailand (1965–) 
Vietnam National Liberation Front (1958–75) 
Source: Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a 
Region, reprint edition, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2013), 123. 
Table 2.   Selected Separatist Movements in Southeast Asia, 1946–1976 
Country Armed Rebellion 
Myanmar Ethnically related armed rebellions (1948–) 
Indonesia Organisasi Papua Merdeka (1963–) 
Aceh Merdeka (1976–2005)82 
Fretilin (1974–1999) 
Laos Le Ligue de Resistance Meo (1946–75) 
Philippines Moro National Liberation Front (1972–) 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1984–) 
Thailand Pattani United Liberation Organization (1967– 
Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (1971–) 
Source: Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a 
Region, reprint edition, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2013), 123. 
82 Dissolved after peace agreement was signed in August 2005. 
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In the early 2000s, some of the separatist movements and internal armed conflicts 
had reduced their activities and signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the 
government due to various reasons, such as political and economic factors. The 
FRETILIN automatically dissolved and its armed members were transformed into the 
Timor Leste armed forces after gaining independence in 1999. After the 2004 tsunami 
severely hit several regions in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean including Aceh, Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) leaders decided to sign a peace agreement with the Indonesian 
government on August 15, 2015, in Helsinki, Finland, which was mediated by the former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.83 Several separatist groups still continue pursuing 
their political goals including the MILF in the Southern Philippines and Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Pattani in Thailand. The reduction in separatist activities and the capability 
of governments to mitigate the existing separatist movement have minimized internal 
challenges in Southeast Asia.  
2. Regional Security Problems
After the Cold War ended, Southeast Asian countries faced several regional 
security challenges such as intramural territorial disputes and the South China Sea 
disputes. Through bilateral agreements and the International Court of Justice settlement, 
some territorial disputes have been solved for example the Pedra Branca and the Sipadan-
Ligitan. In contrast, the South China Sea disputes still exist and challenge peace and 
stability of the region. 
a. Territorial Dispute
Bilateral disputes that were dominated by territorial claims on land and at sea 
might still lead to escalated military conflicts in Southeast Asia. The Pedra Branca 
dispute between Malaysia and Singapore; the Sipadan and Ligitan islands case; and the 
case of Ambalat and conflicting claims by Malaysia and Indonesia, in which both parties 
sent their naval assets to deter and anticipate the use of force, were some of the prevalent 
cases of maritime territorial quarrels among countries in the region. At the same time, 
83“Aceh Rebels Sign Peace Agreement,” BBC, August 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4151980.stm. 
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unsettled bilateral disputes on land—for example, between Thailand and Cambodia over 
the Temple of Preah Vihear, which triggered armed conflict in 2000— have also left a 
residue of security problems.84 
In both maritime territorial disputes described here, the opposed countries had 
resolved their arguments through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after several 
incidents of tension between their respective naval ships during the process of 
negotiation. In 2002, Malaysia won the claim over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. In the 
Pedra Branca case, the ICJ had decided to recognize Singapore’s sovereignty over the 
Pedra Branca, but decided that Malaysia owned Middle Rocks.85 Acharya points out that 
although it failed to address the Preah Vihear dispute, the ICJ’s involvement in resolving 
the territorial dispute among countries in the region shows another significant step in 
ASEAN members’ conflict management and resolution by peaceful means.86 
b. The South China Sea Dispute 
Since it shows no sign of ending soon, the territorial dispute in the South China 
Sea remains in the highest rank of security threats in Southeast Asia.87 Although all 
claimants have agreed to adhere to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to 
prevent escalation, China’s increasing assertiveness in the area makes others wary of its 
intentions. In 2007, three incidents amplified the tension in the South China Sea 
involving the PRC and Vietnam.88 First, in April, the China’s complaint toward Hanoi’s 
agreement with British Petroleum (BP) to conduct exploration in the Con Son Basin. 
Second, in July, the fire incident by a Chinese naval ship killed one fisherman. Moreover, 
the Chinese Navy also conducted naval exercise, and Beijing started promoting the 
Paracels tourism. Lastly, in December, China created Sansha city to manage the Paracels 
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and Spratlys. Nonetheless, the PRC and China could alleviate the tension through 
diplomatic approach.89  
Additionally, its growing military capabilities in the past ten years have signaled 
an alarm that China will continue pursuing its 9-dashed-line territorial claim by 
potentially using military action. Based on a RAND Corporation assessment in 2001, 
Acharya points out that the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China’s) aggressive behaviors in 
pursuing its territorial claim over the South China Sea, which is supported by adequate 
naval capabilities, exhibits two conventional military threats to Southeast Asia: 
endangering freedom of navigation and possible military maneuvers.90 The probability of 
China using military power to annex a territory is seen as high. Another trauma like the 
1995 Mischief Reef incident seems highly probable. In addition, it has changed the 
balance of power in the region. Facing this trend with insufficient military capabilities, 
countries in the region may logically seek assistance from major powers countries.91 
Thus, the possibility of a power rivalry is more likely to happen, and the great power 
competition will again be established in the region. 
Furthermore, although it involves countries outside Southeast Asia, the South 
China Sea dispute is considered a regional conflict since most of the area is within the 
region and the impact of the dispute will directly or indirectly hamper the Southeast 
Asian states. Therefore, it is logical that the regional countries under the ASEAN 
umbrella would make a collective effort to urge China to negotiate a solution. In 
response, however, Beijing has consistently rejected the proposal and has preferred to 
engage the problem through a bilateral mechanism.92 This indicates that the South China 
Sea Dispute will remain a longstanding, unsolved problem. 
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3. Global and Transnational Security Challenges
The emergence of the non-traditional security threats such sea piracy and armed 
robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, and natural disasters has presented another 
complex predicament to the countries in Southeast Asia to solve. These security 
challenges are transnational, which means the source of threats comes from one state, and 
the impacts may be transmitted to other neighboring states. In addition, in contrast with 
the traditional threats, which are mainly committed by states, the actors of the non-
traditional security challenges actors are non-states.  
a. Sea Piracy and Armed Robbery
Besides the possible security impact of the South China Sea issue, Southeast Asia 
is also still occupied with other maritime security threats—piracy and armed robbery and 
their implications. In the mid-2000s, the increasing number of piracy and armed robbery 
activities in the Malacca Straits attracted world attention and attributed to the area being 
named the most dangerous waters in the world.93 Figure 1 shows the pattern of incidents 
in Southeast Asian waters, including the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. The 
graph shows the increasing number of incidents in the early 2000s. The downslope in the 
chart occurred in the period from 2004 to 2010. Since 2012 and until quite recently, the 
curve shows an incline. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) against Ships in Asia reported that the maritime piracy and 
armed robbery in Asia has grown 8 percent in the first semester of 2015, most of which 
occurred in the Malacca Straits and the Singapore Straits.94 This data evidently illustrates 
that piracy and armed robbery continues to pose security challenges in the region. 
93 Adam McCauley, “The Most Dangerous Waters in The World,” TIME, accessed October 20, 2015, 
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94 Ship & Bunker News Team, “Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia Rises 18%,” Ship & 
Bunker, July 20, 2015, http://shipandbunker.com/news/apac/502310-maritime-piracy-and-armed-robbery-
in-asia-rises-18; ReCAAP Information Sharing Center, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 




Figure 1.  Piracy and Armed Robbery Incidents per Year (Worldwide), 
1984–2012 
Source: International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed 




The aftermath of the Bali Bombing in 2002 following the 9/11 terrorist attack in 
2001 on American soil made Southeast Asia an important region for the War on 
Terrorism campaign. The Bali incident indicated the linkage between al-Qaeda and a 
terrorist network in Southeast Asia—the Jemaah Islamiyah group—which is active to this 
day.95 Washington had described the region as the “second front” in the war on 
terrorism.96 Based on the Global Terrorism Database, the infographic in Figure 2 shows 
the ten most active terrorist groups in Southeast Asia since 197097 and illustrates their 
active period and activities, while Figure 3 shows incidents of terrorism in Southeast Asia 
in 2013. Most of the attacks took place in Thailand and the Philippines. These statistics 
95 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 201. 
96 John Aglionby, “Powell Shores Up South-East Asia Support,” Guardian, July 29, 2002, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/30/malaysia. 
97 Michael Jensen, “Infographic: Terrorism in Southeast Asia—Serious, Violent, and Unique,” War on 
the Rocks, July 23, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/infographic-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-
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and mapping obviously suggest that terrorism clearly remains a prominent security threat 
to Southeast Asia.  
Furthermore, the region has become a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorist cells and 
networks to expand their efforts. As Acharya has observed, a number of factors—
including a large Moslem population, various entry-exit access points without sufficient 
control by local authorities, low levels of education, economic hardships, and remote 
areas—have made this region favorable for terrorist operations of recruitment, training, 
execution, and logistic support.98 As al-Qaeda’s regional link, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
has played an important role in supporting and exercising al-Qaeda operations by creating 
a more sophisticated, complex network in Southeast Asia and by working with other 
Islamic-based groups in the region, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Kumpulan Militan Malaysian 
(KMM) in Malaysia, and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).99 This situation has 
produced multifaceted challenges for governments in Southeast Asia in undertaking anti-
terrorist measures. They require cooperative efforts within their respective governmental 
structures and with their neighbors. 
98 Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, “The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the ‘War on 




Figure 2.  Ten Most Active Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia (1970–2013) 
 
Source: Michael Jensen, “Infographic: Terrorism in Southeast Asia—Serious, Violent, and Unique,” War on the Rocks, accessed October 20, 
2015, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/infographic-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-serious-violent-and-unique/. 
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Figure 3.  Incidents of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2013) 
Source: Lorraine Elliott, “ASEAN and Environmental Governance: Strategies of 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia,” Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 3 (2012): 39. 
c. Environmental Challenges: The Haze
Another problem that is complicated to address without a cooperative approach is 
environmental challenges.100 According to Lorraine Elliott, most of these problems have 
transferable impacts beyond a state’s territorial border.101 An explicit example is the air 
pollution caused by a massive forest fire widely known as “the Haze.”102 Although it 
originates in Indonesia, the Haze moves across borders. The primary cause of this 
problem has been traditional land clearing that is done by burning the vegetation, mainly 
for agricultural purposes.103 Although it is a low-cost method, land burning can create a 
huge problem when it goes uncontrolled.  
100 Lorraine Elliott, “ASEAN and Environmental Governance: Strategies of Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia,” Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 3 (2012): 39. 
101 Ibid. 
102 James Cotton, “The ‘Haze’ over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional 
Engagement,” Pacific Affairs 72, no. 3 (1999): 331, doi:10.2307/2672225. 
103 In addition, most of the lands were rain forests that produced peatlands, which have unique 
characteristics: continuously flammable and smoky. 
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The haze issue has been a longstanding problem in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia 
has been the largest contributor. In 1982–1983, more than 3.5 million hectares of forest in 
East Kalimantan were burned, and the fire increased to 4 million hectares in 1997–1998. 
Recently, in October 2015, Indonesia again experienced the same problem in the 
Sumatera and Kalimantan regions. Satellite images indicated hundreds of fire spots in the 
area and, even worse, the fire had expanded to other islands.104 The fire could increase 
and worsen if it happened during El Nino, which causes longer dry season.105 The haze 
has paid a large toll on the health of people in the region, and has also severed economic 
activities such as air transportation. 
To address this problem, in addition to conducting physical responses by sending 
troops and fire brigades, Indonesia and other ASEAN members have undertaken a series 
of soft measures through various conferences, meetings, and workshops to produce 
comprehensive strategies. Indonesia had inadequate capabilities to act individually. 
Therefore, it requested international assistance. The first step was an international 
conference on Long-Term Integrated Forest Fire Management in Bandung in 1992, which 
was followed by a series of meetings. In this conference, ASEAN initially declared that 
the haze was “a regional problem requiring regional cooperation.”106 In 1995, the 
association validated the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution 
(ACPTP) that provided a number of concrete actions to prevent and mitigate the risks.107 
Another further effort was the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) in 1997.108 Although 
many mechanisms and efforts have been established, the haze remains problematic. 
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d. Natural Disasters 
Southeast Asia is considered a vulnerable region for natural disasters. A range of 
natural disasters have frequently occurred and destroyed the locations that have been hit. 
The most tragic one was the Indian Ocean’s 9.0-magnitude earthquake and tsunami in 
2004, which affected Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, and the East coast of Africa. In Indonesia, Aceh experienced the most 
devastation.109 
Cyclones and typhoons are other environmental challenges that frequently affect 
Southeast Asia with devastating impacts. In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis blew out the 
Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar where “84,500 people were killed and 53,800 went missing. 
A total of 37 townships were significantly affected by the cyclone. The UN estimates that 
as many as 2.4 million people were affected.”110 Although it has experienced various 
storms, the Category 5 Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) that slammed the 
Philippines on November 8, 2013 caused President Benigno S. Aquino III to announce 
the highest level of national emergency due to its massive impacts.111 The typhoon 
affected over 14 million people, including more than 4 million who had to leave their 
homes, more than 6,000 who died, and around 1,700 who were missing; over one million 
houses were devastated, according to data from the Philippine government.112 
Frequent volcanic eruptions continue the list of natural disasters in Southeast 
Asia. Living in the “Ring of Fire” of the Pacific Ocean makes the region vulnerable to 
seismic activities such as eruption and earthquake.113 Indonesia is one of the countries in 
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the region that has many volcanic mountains. In 2010, Mount Merapi, one of the world’s 
most active volcanos, erupted and affected more than 75,000 residents, killing over 
100.114 These facts show that natural disasters are one of the prominent challenges for 
Southeast Asian countries. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the development of security challenges in Southeast Asia 
from domestic, regional, global, and transnational scopes to illustrate their dynamics and 
nature during and after the Cold War. It shows a major shifting from the traditional to 
non-traditional security challenges. Since its inception in 1967 until the late 1990s, when 
focused on state making and nation building, ASEAN members faced domestic 
challenges such as separatist groups and freedom movement that were prevailing due to 
economic hardship and military activities. In the Cold War era, the countries in this 
region focused their efforts mostly on state-making and nation-building. Therefore, 
domestic challenges such as separatist groups and freedom movements were dominant 
due to economic hardships and military activities. At the same time, the Cold War rivalry 
heightened the intramural conflict among the countries in the region caused by territorial 
and border disputes. Furthermore, the fear of communist threats remained high in this era 
since communist countries—the Soviet Union and China—continued their efforts in 
maintaining influence in the region. Moscow supported Vietnam’s invasion into 
Cambodia, and China assisted communist insurgencies. 
In the post–Cold War period, security challenges mainly stem from external and 
transnational sources. Since 1990s, the ASEAN governments had achieved significant 
economic developments, and internal security challenges also had decreased. 
Additionally, the regional challenges also decreased after the Cambodian conflict in 
1991, and the regional states revisited their relationships with Indochinese states and 
admitted them into ASEAN. Nevertheless, the 2007 incidents in the South China Sea 
showed growing Chinese threats to the region. Moreover, the regional challenges also 
114 “Dozens Die in New Mount Merapi Eruption in Indonesia,” BBC News, November 5, 2010, 
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decreased after the Cambodian conflict, and the regional states revisited their 
relationships with Indochinese states. Although disputes over territory and sovereignty 
continue, including in the South China Sea, traditional armed conflict has not occurred 
since the Thailand and Cambodian fire exchange in the Temple Preah Vihear. For the 
conflicting parties, a peaceful solution is more preferable than the use of force. 
Even though traditional threats have decreased, the security challenges in 
Southeast Asia have become more complex and difficult to overcome through a single-
state response because non-traditional threats have emerged, such as natural disasters, 
maritime piracy, the haze, terrorism and so on. The transnational nature of these 
challenges, the correspondence with non-state actors, and the multifaceted, uncontrolled 
qualities require regional states to address the challenges through cooperative strategies.  
To summarize, the strategic environment in Southeast Asia after the Cold War has 
created more complex, dynamic security challenges to regional countries. Table 3 
illustrates the development of security challenges in Southeast Asia. Although traditional 
security challenges still require attention, the region currently has to deal more with 
transnational security challenges that limit states’ control and require cooperative 
approaches in broader scope including defense cooperation. 
Table 3.   Comparison of Security Challenges in Southeast Asia 
Security Challenges 
Domestic Regional External/Global Transnational 
The Cold War High High Medium Low 
Post-Cold War Medium to Low Medium Medium Medium to High 
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III. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN ASEAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To overcome security challenges, a state can employ its defense force. In 
developed countries, governments use military forces to encounter threats from outside 
and use civilian law enforcement to address domestic security challenges. Meanwhile, 
developing countries employ their armed forces to suppress all security threats 
domestically and externally.115 These efforts commonly occurred during the state-making 
and nation-building in Southeast Asian countries. Their defense forces, however, could 
not simultaneously deal with internal and external security challenges. 
Facing this deficiency and having the types of security challenges described in 
Chapter II, Southeast Asian countries needed cooperation in the military sector to 
enhance their defense capabilities and thus properly address the challenges. In the earlier 
decades of ASEAN, some leaders delivered proposals to create a form of regional 
military cooperation to address security challenges in the region through formal and 
informal meetings. Jakarta proposed a “joint defence council” in 1976.116 Similarly, in 
1982, Singapore Prime Minster Lee Kuan Yew saw the need to conduct trilateral ASEAN 
military exercises, and the former Malaysian prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
suggested an ASEAN “joint command.”117 In 1989, the former minister of Malaysia, 
Abu Hassan Omar, recommended a concept of a “Defence Community.”118 
Nevertheless, the five original members of ASEAN rejected these ideas. They 
believed that the proposals to create defense cooperation would limit ASEAN’s 
flexibility in managing existing intramural conflicts and economic cooperation. In 
addition, establishing defense cooperation could increase Chinese or Soviet suspicion and 
possibly trigger an attack against a member.119 In the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in 
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1976, the minister of Malaysia, Hussein Onn, stated that changing the direction of 
ASEAN to a security alliance would create suspicion and weaken its efforts to achieve its 
goals.120 Looking at these disadvantages, leaders of the association persistently rejected 
the idea of military alliance. 
Furthermore, members’ lack of defense capabilities was another reason for 
rejecting the idea of multilateral military cooperation.121 Most of the association’s 
members still had very small militaries. They had insufficient capabilities to project 
military force into a conflict zone. This impeded their ability to commit to provide direct 
military assistance to a member that was threatened, such as in 1970 when Indonesia 
declared its intention to assist Thailand which anticipated attack from Vietnam, which 
was also supported by Singapore and Malaysia in 1978.122 In addition, most countries 
still encountered internal challenges from separatist movements. To address these 
challenges, their governments put greater emphasis on economic development. 
Looking at the impact of great power rivalry, ASEAN decided to impose political 
barriers for external involvement in the region. It declared a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This step stemmed from the military weakness of ASEAN 
members and the prospect of Britain and the United States withdrawing from the region, 
which persuaded them to exercise a self-reliance policy. For the members, the ZOPFAN 
could enhance their security more than a military alliance.123 
While rejecting the idea of broader defense cooperation, the regional countries 
successfully managed some bilateral military arrangements. The background of these 
arrangements was initially to address traditional threats from communist and regional 
border insurgencies. The areas of cooperation were intelligence sharing, joint exercises 
and training. Since then, they have expanded these bilateral arrangements into broader 
fields, even after communism has faded from the region.124 As Acharya pointed out, 
120 Ibid., 163. 
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124 Ibid., 164. 
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ASEAN members saw that bilateral defense cooperation was more beneficial and 
relatively easier to deal with than multilateral defense cooperation.125 Moreover, ASEAN 
members obtained significant benefits from bilateral defense cooperation, such as 
increasing security awareness and enhancing capabilities in traditional military skills. 
This growing bilateral defense cooperation created an ASEAN “defence spider web,” a 
term that was firstly coined by the chief of Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try 
Sutrisno, in 1989.126 This web was seen as the initial foundation for a broader scope of 
defense cooperation. 
Since 2003, ASEAN members have changed their policy on defense cooperation. 
During the 9th ASEAN Summit that year, by signing the Bali Concord II, the members 
agreed to enhance their cooperation in the security arena, including defense under the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) umbrella. The proposal to establish a 
security community was made by Indonesia, which saw the need to revisit ASEAN’s role 
in answering the emergence of nontraditional threats.127 Prior to this consensus, its 
members had continuously undertaken their existing bilateral cooperation and engaged in 
several multilateral defense activities in the form of meetings and operations. 
Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, and C. R. Neu claimed that the policy to 
exercise defense cooperation at a multilateral level to address security problems in 
ASEAN was driven by three factors: “the proliferation of transnational problems that 
cannot be solved at the national level, uncertainty about the future of the U.S. security 
role in the region, and the expectation that locking China into multilateral security 
arrangements might constrain its behavior and induce it to take greater account of 
ASEAN interests and sensitivities.”128 The formalization of defense cooperation in the 
ADMM and the ADMM-Plus exemplified this argument. Carlyle A. Thayer identified 
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that the meetings emphasized their focus on “addressing non-traditional security threats 
and enhancing cooperation with ASEAN’s dialogue partner counterparts.”129 During the 
3rd ADMM in Bangkok in 2009, ASEAN endorsed four official documents: 
Joint Declaration on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Establishments to 
Meet the Challenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats, The Use of 
ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster relief, ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non‑traditional Security, and 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Principles for 
Membership.130 
The trend in ASEAN’s official public documents also indicated ASEAN focus on 
non-traditional security challenges. In the period from 1967 to 2009, a study conducted 
by the University of Indonesia found that more than 50 percent of these documents 
addressed non-traditional security issues.131 
While it shows the same path, the formation of ADMM-Plus also reflected 
ASEAN’s strategy to enmesh major powers, particularly the United States and China. 
Establishing the meeting allowed the association to ensure the continuity of U.S. 
engagement in the region and possibly alleviate China’s growing assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. Since the ADMM-Plus also concentrated on tackling non-traditional 
security issues, China agreed to accept ASEAN invitation to participate in the meeting. 
As its defense minister, Liang Guanglie, stated during the first ADMM in Hanoi in 2010, 
“Non-traditional security threats are transnational and unpredictable, and require joint 
response. We support ADMM-Plus in focusing on non-traditional cooperation.”132 This 
chapter examines the development of defense cooperation in Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
to identify the factors that influence regional states’ responses to ASEAN defense 
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cooperation framework. As a comparison, the chapter uses the Bali Concord II or year 
2003 as a turning point. 
B. DEFENSE COOPERATION PRIOR TO THE BALI CONCORD II 
Before the Bali Concord II, defense cooperation among Southeast Asian countries 
was more prevalent at the bilateral level as the result of ASEAN leaders’ opposition to a 
multilateral framework. There were three primary areas of military cooperation under a 
bilateral framework: border security, intelligence exchange, exercises and trainings; the 
defense industry (arms transfer and equipment standardization); and security dialogue 
(the ASEAN Regional Forum and defense officials meetings).133 The first three occurred 
on a bilateral basis. The other two, and later intelligence sharing, worked in a multilateral 
setting. 
1. Border Security Arrangement
According to Acharya, all bilateral military cooperation since ASEAN’s inception 
started from border control agreements. The purpose of border region cooperation was 
formerly to prevent and contain the spreading of communism and its insurgencies and 
illegal activities. The agreements dealt with land and maritime border management. In the 
land regime, Indonesia and Malaysia and Malaysia and Thailand respectively approved 
their border control agreements in 1967 and 1977. On the maritime side, agreements 
happened between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Malaysia and the Philippines.134 
Both agreements on land border region cooperation had two purposes: to prevent 
communist insurgencies spillover and suppress illegal activities. The Malaysia–Thailand 
border cooperation was established to maintain monitoring activities of the Communist 
Party Malaysia (CPM) after it was defeated by the British Campaign. Following the same 
purpose, the Indonesia–Malaysia border arrangement expanded the scope to maritime 
border in 1984.135 
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In the maritime domain, the border settlement has primarily focus on illegal 
activities. Indonesia and the Philippines established their cooperation on a Border 
Crossing Agreement in 1961 and followed by a Joint Patrol Border in 1975 named the 
CORPATPHILINDO (Coordinated Patrol Philippines-Indonesia). This settlement had 
two purposes. The first was to provide a legal umbrella for the ancient, existing family 
ties between people living in the Southern Philippines and in the Northern islands of 
North Sulawesi to easily travel crossing the border back and forth. The latter was to 
monitor and encounter any illegal activities at the sea border. Similarly, the Indonesia–
Malaysia maritime border agreement dealt with cross-border activities, criminal offenses, 
and defense cooperation.136 The scope of the border security arrangement also enlarged 
to operational aspects such as joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint patrols.137 
These activities produced positive outcomes not only to reach the goal of the settlement 
but also to enhance military skills and interoperability. 
2. Intelligence Exchange
Intelligence sharing has played a vital role in achieving the goals of a bilateral 
border security arrangement. This initiative emerged during the Indochinese crisis and 
communist rebellion. Agreements to use intelligence exchanges to combat internal 
insurgencies were made between Manila and Bangkok in 1976, between Singapore and 
the Philippines in the same year, and between Bangkok and Jakarta in 1978. Nonetheless, 
ASEAN countries covertly executed their intelligence exchange to avoid greater tensions. 
After the crisis, intelligence sharing significantly increased and became an important field 
for multilateral military cooperation.138 
3. Military Exercises
Military exercises between countries in Southeast Asia initially developed from 
border security initiatives and operations. Since the 1970s, the number and type of these 
military exercises have grown from largely involving a single service to including 
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multiple services. As shown in Table 4, the interaction between the air forces and navies 
of Southeast Asian countries was more dominant than between the armies. These 
exercises had several goals: to enhance skills in conducting military operations, to reduce 
technical barriers in doctrines and procedures, to obtain a deterrence effect, to amplify 
confidence-building measures, and to save defense expenses.139 Looking at these positive 
outcomes, military exercises were a reasonable option to maintain and magnify military 
cooperation among ASEAN members.  
Table 4.   Bilateral Military Exercises in ASEAN (1972–1997) 
Name of Exercise Type Participating States Start Frequency 
Air Thamal Air Malaysia-Thailand 1981 Annual 
Anoa-Singa Land Phillipines-Singapore 1993 Annual 
Darsasa Malindo All Indonesia-Malaysia 1982 Intermittent 
Eagle Air/naval Indonesia-Singapore 1974 Annual 
Elang Indopura Air Indonesia-Singapore 1980 Annual 
Elang Thainesia Air Indonesia-Thailand 1980 Annual 
Elang Malindo Air Indonesia-Malaysia 1975 Biennial 
Englek Naval Indonesia-Singapore 1974 Biennial 
Hornbill (& others) Naval Brunei-Malaysia 1981 Intermittent 
Kekar Malindo Land Indonesia-Malaysia 1977 Annual 
Kripura Malindo Land Indonesia-Malaysia 1981 Intermittent 
Kocha Singa Land Singapore-Thailand 1997 Annual 
Maju Bersama Land Brunei-Singapore 1994 Annual 
Malapura Naval Malaysia-Singapore 1984 Annual 
Malindo Jaya Naval Indonesia-Malaysia 1973 Annual 
Pelican Naval Brunei-Singapore 1979 Annual 
Philindo/Corpatphilindo Naval Indonesia-Philippines 1972 Intermittent 
Safkar Indopura Land Indonesia-Singapore 1988 Annual 
Sea Garuda Naval Indonesia-Thailand 1975 Intermittent 
Semangat Bersatu Land Malaysia-Singapore 1989 Intermittent 
Sing-Siam Air Singapore-Thailand 1981 Intermittent 
Tatar Malindo Land Indonesia-Malaysia 1981 Intermittent 
Termite/Flaming Arrow/
Juggernaut 
Land Brunei-Singapore 1985 Annual 
Thai-Sing Naval Singapore-Thailand 1983 Annual 
Thalay Naval Malaysia-Thailand 1980 Intermittent 
Source: See Seng Tan, “‘Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8, no. 3 (September 2012): 235, doi:10.1080/
14799855.2012.723919.
139 Ibid., 18. 
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4. Defense Industry 
The defense industry was another promising area for regional military cooperation 
in ASEAN. Many military leaders repeatedly voiced the idea to endorse a regional 
defense industry including arms manufacture, weapon standardization, joint purchases, 
and the transfer of technology. The goals of this program were primarily economic: to 
achieve self-sufficiency and competitive value over external products.140 In addition, 
establishing a collaborative defense industry could produce other benefits: reducing cost-
production, establishing sustainable logistics chain, increasing interoperability, and 
preventing arms races. Looking at these advantages, it made sense that members of the 
association would support this initiative. 
Nevertheless, further implementation of this defense industry proposal had been 
stagnant. There were some steps by Indonesia and Singapore, which had firstly developed 
arms manufacturing in the 1980s and the 1990s to undertake this program. Indonesia, 
using its aircraft industry, produced and exported various types of aircraft to ASEAN 
members. Likewise, Singapore, having advanced in shipbuilding capability, actively sold 
its naval patrol boats and Fast Attack Aircraft (FAC).141 Factors such as an unbalanced 
level of technology acquisition, different interest and economic policies, and defense 
budget allocation constrained subsequent efforts for expansion to include other countries. 
5. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF was born to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and 
cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The end of the Cold War created a vacuum of power in 
the region and left ASEAN members anxious about stability in the region. They faced the 
emergence of new major powers without external power guarantors. Looking at this 
situation, in 1994, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish a regional organization with 
broader memberships to include major powers such as China, Japan, and the United 
States, which had currently competed for influence in region. This momentum indicated a 
fundamental change in the ASEAN view of multilateral security cooperation. 
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Although it had conducted several steps to achieve its goals, the forum failed to 
turn its dialogues for preventive diplomacy into concrete implementation. With 27 
members, the ARF has brought a wide range of security issues to be discussed within a 
multilateral setting, including transnational threats. Information exchange on defense 
policy and white papers has also occurred among participants. Additionally, its members 
have developed a network for national security and defense and military officials.142 
These achievements, however, have been sluggish without a significant realization of 
goals. According to Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, the “divergent strategic outlooks” of 
its members was one of the factors impeding the ARF in attempts to enhance security 
cooperation.143 In addition, the involvement of ASEAN defense officials has been 
limited. In this context, assuming the ARF as a multilateral defense cooperation is far 
from relevant. Nevertheless, the forum reflected ASEAN’s initial, important attempt to 
create a multilateral defense cooperation. This initiative also demonstrated ASEAN 
leaders’ shared vision that the association required a broader scope of security 
cooperation involving members’ defense officials. 
6. Defense Officials Meetings 
Besides their dialogue engagement in the ARF, defense officials in ASEAN have 
also frequently met on other formal and informal occasions multilaterally on an annual 
basis. Started in 2002, the annual ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting 
(ACDFIM) provides a place for ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces to build networks and 
trust. It continuously develops and enlarges the area of cooperation, with not only talks 
but also real activities.144 Until 2014, the ACDFIM has conducted 11 meetings. 
Similarly, chiefs from the three services—army, navy, and air force—have created such 
forums. In 2000, ASEAN Army Chiefs started their engagement in the ASEAN Chiefs of 
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Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM) to discuss security issues in the region. Through 
personal interactions, they strengthen their relationships to promote trust and enhance 
capacity and professionalism.145 The ASEAN Navy Interaction (now officially named 
the ASEAN Naval Chiefs’ Meeting, or ANCM) established in 2001 provides an annual 
forum to develop and expand naval cooperation and interoperability.146 Initiated in 2004, 
Air Force Chiefs of ASEAN annually meet in the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference 
(AACC) to discuss issues and air forces’ interests and to formulate action-plan 
recommendations to strengthen their relationships.147 Furthermore, the military 
interaction in ASEAN also manifests in the form of a military sports competition: the 
ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet (AARM).148 
C. DEFENSE COOPERATION AFTER THE BALI CONCORD II 
Since the endorsement of the APSC under the Bali Concord II in 2003, defense 
cooperation within ASEAN has significantly developed. While maintaining existing 
bilateral military cooperation, the members have expanded and realized various regional 
and multilateral arrangements. Collaborative maritime operations and intelligence sharing 
are some of these crucial efforts, among others. The institutionalization of the ASEAN 
Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 marked this expansion and demonstrated members’ 
real commitment to multilateral defense cooperation.  
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1. Multilateral Coordinated Patrol 
Multilateral maritime cooperation is one of the important arenas in Southeast Asia 
security and the defense framework. This cooperation initially established outside the 
ASEAN framework, however. Later, the ASEAN adopted this field into its area of 
cooperation under the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Following the increasing number of 
piracy attacks and armed robberies in the Malacca Straits, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore launched the first Malaysia–Singapore–Indonesia Coordinated Patrol 
(MALSINDO CORPAT) in July 2004.149 This trilateral naval operation is under the 
Malacca Straits Sea Patrol Joint Working Groups (MSSP JWG) supervision. The 
background of this initiative was that the problems in the Straits of Malacca required 
comprehensive, cooperative efforts among coastal countries; external involvement is 
unnecessary. 
The MALSINDO then evolved to enlarge its area of cooperation by establishing 
the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) in 2005 and the Intelligence Exchange Group in 2006 and 
endorsing the Thailand Navy’s participation. Both arrangements were designed to 
support patrolling ships with adequate intelligence information. As a continuation of 
these initiatives, the countries decided to build the Malacca Straits Patrol Information 
System (MSP-IS). In 2008, the Thailand Navy started its contribution to the Malacca 
Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP).150 This commitment enhanced the capacity of the previous 
force composition in terms of patrolling assets, area coverage, and intelligence gathering.  
2. Expanding Intelligence Sharing: The ASEAN Information-Sharing 
Portal 
The need to provide real-time and sufficient maritime pictures drove ASEAN 
navies’ leaders to enhance their existing information sharing. Led by the Republic of 
Singapore Navy (RSN) and the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), ASEAN navies developed 
and officially launched the ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal (AIP) in July 2012. The 
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purpose of the portal is to “provide a common platform for ASEAN navies to share 
maritime security-related information in the region and enhance information-sharing 
procedures.”151 Every country has attached its Liaison Officer to the center. The system 
allows members to easily access the information through permanent and mobile stations. 
At the official launching, the countries also initiated the first ASEAN Maritime 
Information-Sharing Exercise.152 
3. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) 
Endorsed in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006, the ADMM is “the highest defense 
consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN.”153 It also denoted the association’s 
embarking on a multilateral defense and security framework, which had been consistently 
rejected by its members. As stated in the Concept Paper, the ADMM has four purposes: 
promoting regional peace and stability, supervising dialogues and cooperation, 
encouraging mutual trust and confidence, and supporting the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC) establishment.154 Besides the important role of cooperative security, 
this commitment bolsters the United Nations’ concept of “security regions.”155 
Furthermore, the institutionalization of existing defense and military engagements 
among members into the ADMM purview represents a major shift in the association’s 
policy toward multilateral defense cooperation. This transformation opens a wide 
window for a broader scope of military and defense arrangements to address security 
challenges within the region and, to some extent, to deal with global security. According 
to Tomotaka Shoji, the ADMM approached this idea by deliberately providing “an 
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atmosphere of security cooperation and dialogue within ASEAN.”156 The establishment 
of the ADMM indicated that the association implemented the concept of defense 
diplomacy, which is “to forge positive and productive relationships among militaries in 
the region, leading to the creation and maintenance of a peaceful and stable security 
environment.”157 The ADMM has identified that the region recently had to deal with new 
security challenges in the form of non-traditional security threats and initiated several 
steps to address these issues, such as establishing cooperation between ASEAN Defense 
Establishments with the Civil Society Organization (CSO), strengthening ASEAN 
Defense Establishments, and strengthening defense cooperation of ASEAN.158 Hence, 
ASEAN defense establishments would have more significant roles to play in maintaining 
security of the region. 
To meet its goals, the ADMM formulates its roadmaps in the Three-Year Program 
as guidance and an outline. This document contains priorities for the activities that the 
meeting should achieve. Setting priorities every three years helps the ADMM members to 
bolster their engagements in practical defense and security cooperation. Moreover, the 
decision of the ADMM to emphasize its cooperation on the non-traditional security 
threats is more acceptable. Based on ASEAN’s experiences, it is more difficult to achieve 
a consensus on solving traditional security issues such as the South China Sea disputes 
because each member has polarized views and different interests, according to Shoji.159 
The ADMM has set four areas of non-traditional security as its current agenda: 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping operations, and the 
defense industry. On HA/DR, the ADMM has conducted three workshops and produced 
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documents such as the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby 
Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 
Operations (SASOP) in 2009 following the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on 
Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) on July 26, 2005, in 
Vientiane, Lao PDR, and the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Utilisation of 
Military Assets for HADR under the Framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) on March 18, 2015.160 To realize its 
commitment to peacekeeping operations, the meeting developed the Peacekeeping Center 
Network in 2012 and conducted the Regional Workshop on Operational Challenges 
Facing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations at Indonesian Peacekeeping Training 
Center in Sentul in November 2012. This initiative allows members to conduct joint 
training and share experiences. On the defense industry, the ADMM has held three 
workshops on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) since 2012.161 These 
serial defense engagements demonstrate the ASEAN’s strong commitment to 
accommodate multilateral defense cooperation among its members through the ADMM. 
4. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) 
After the establishment of the ADMM, ASEAN continued its endeavor to 
enhance security and defense cooperation by endorsing the ADMM-Plus during the 4th 
ADMM in Vietnam in 2010. This step was the manifestation of the ADMM commitment 
to maintain its “open, flexible, and outward-looking” behavior.162 As it enjoyed benefits 
from its external engagements such as the ARF, ASEAN expected more advantages 
through practical defense cooperation with its dialogue partners—Australia, China, India, 
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Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russian Federation, and the United States—to address 
complex security challenges under the ADMM-Plus framework. 
Although it adopted the same principles as the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus 
expanded its area of cooperation into five fields: maritime security, counter-terrorism, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and military 
medicine. To supervise and facilitate cooperation in these areas, the ADMM endorsed 
five Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) on temporary base, which means an EWG could 
be dissolved after the goal is obtained.163 On May 7, 2013, the ADMM-Plus established a 
new EWG on humanitarian mine action.164  
As stipulated in the ADMM Modalities and Procedures, the ADMM-Plus should 
work on practical cooperation to address key issues especially non-traditional and 
transnational security challenges. This commitment requires a concrete action, not only 
written on paper. To fulfill its commitment, the ADMM EWGs have conducted a series 
of exercises. In 2012, the ADMM-Plus EWG on Military Medicine and Maritime 
Security held a table-top exercise in July and September 2012. The ADMM-Plus 
recorded a historical endeavor in 2013 when the military forces from ASEAN and the 
eight counterpart countries executed practical exercises in four of the five areas of the 
ADMM-Plus: the HADR Military Medicine in Brunei, Counter-Terrorism Exercise 
(CTX) in Indonesia, and Maritime Security Field Training Exercise in Australia. In 
February 2014, the members conducted a table-top exercise on peacekeeping operations 
in Manila.165 
Given the development of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus, “ASEAN has started 
to move forward in the right direction,” as a political observer from the Indonesian 
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Institute of Sciences, Riefqi Muna, stated.166 Similarly, the executive director of the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Rizal Sukma, asserted that “there was an 
urgent need for ‘ASEAN’s militaries to quickly build trust and comfort levels to 
cooperate among themselves while solving internal disputes amicably and to back away 
from using force if they want to realize a security community by 2015.’”167 
Enhancing defense cooperation among members has been crucial for ASEAN to 
achieve its goals to promote peace and regional stability by addressing new dimensions 
of security challenges. During the 5th ADMM in 2011, the Indonesian Defense Minister, 
Purnomo Yusgiantoro, reiterated the importance of this initiative: 
While ASEAN was not a defense pact like NATO, the grouping had 
ample opportunity to cooperate on defense issues – and on regional and 
transnational problems. The ten ASEAN member states have no obligation 
to give full political commitment and support to defense cooperation 
because of their own domestic conditions. However, we are all committed 
to forging multilateral defense cooperation to handle common 
problems.168 
At the same tone, the Malaysian Defense Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, said 
that “increasing cooperation would encourage ASEAN’s member nations to enhance 
multilateral cooperation at the regional level.”169 Specifically, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Najib Razak emphasized the role of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus in countering non-
traditional threats such as terrorism conducted by non-state actors like the Islamic State 
(IS): 
This issue [terrorism] has been discussed at sub-ASEAN forums, namely 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus 
meeting in Langkawi recently. This means that ASEAN is aware and has 
acted through defence ministers, home ministers, armed forces and others 
in order to enhance cooperation. This is to enable ASEAN through 
                                                 
166 Ridwan Max Sijabat and Novan Iman Santosa, “Overcoming Conflicts, ASEAN Defense Chiefs 







collective and bilateral efforts work more closely to address the IS threat 
which we cannot and are unable to handle individually. We must act 
collectively.170  
In the 2010 Shangri-Dialogue, the Vietnamese Minister of National Defence, 
General Phung Quang Thanh, clearly stated in his speech that the development of 
security challenges was one of the driving factors that motivated regional countries to 
create multilateral security cooperation such as the ARF, East Asian Summit, ASEAN 
Plus, the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus.171 Regarding the ADMM-Plus, General Thanh 
highlighted the crucial role of the meeting as “a place for consultation, building 
confidence and finding out areas of practical cooperation in defense” to provide “an 
effective solution to the common security challenges and emerging non-traditional 
security challenges.”172 Furthermore, the Vietnamese minister also reiterated the 
important function of the ADMM-Plus as a medium for engaging states that have interest 
and influence in the Asia-Pacific region; it has been “a leap forward,” he said, to 
“Renewing the Regional Security Architecture.”173  
D. SUMMARY 
The evolution of defense cooperation in ASEAN demonstrates the change in the 
direction and the area of cooperation. In its earlier period, ASEAN members consistently 
resisted the idea of a military alliance or defense pact. Yet, they continued building 
collaborative efforts in military affairs in a bilateral arrangement. The political reason for 
their rejection was to prevent their countries from the superpowers’ military offensive 
actions during the Cold War and the Cambodian conflict. In addition, they did not have 
sufficient defense capability to provide direct military assistance by sending troops into 
the member state that was threatened. 
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Nonetheless, bilateral defense cooperation among regional countries has grown 
from time to time. Starting from a border security arrangement, they continued expanding 
their scope into other areas such as intelligence sharing, exercises and training, and the 
defense industry. Regional states recognized and enjoyed some important benefits from 
this bilateral cooperation such as capacity building, in terms of military proficiency and 
technology modernization, and intelligence awareness to support military operations. 
These benefits encouraged ASEAN leaders to enhance defense ties to a multilateral level 
after the Cold War, such as with the ARF. In addition, having achieved significant 
economic growth, the defense capability of regional countries has also increased. 
The direction of ASEAN’s defense role experienced a significant shift when its 
members had to deal with new types of security challenges in the post–Cold War era: 
non-traditional security threats. These threats require collaborative strategies since they 
are transnational in nature. To address such challenges, some ASEAN members initiated 
regional and multilateral defense cooperation such as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol and 
frequent meetings among defense officials. These initiatives, however, worked outside 
the ASEAN mechanism. 
Looking at this development, ASEAN leaders decided to institutionalize defense 
cooperation into a formal mechanism within the association. They were aware that 
multilateral defense cooperation had become more important to address transnational 
security challenges. The establishment of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus exemplified 
this policy change. Both meetings provide opportunities for members and external actors 
to participate in achieving ASEAN goals. This also demonstrates ASEAN’s commitment 
to promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia through concrete actions. 
In sum, this chapter explains how defense cooperation in ASEAN has moved 
from a bilateral to multilateral scope. Table 5 summarizes the development of ASEAN 
defense cooperation. The primary factor in this development is the emergence of non-
traditional security challenges. 
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Table 5.   The Development of Defense Cooperation and Defense Capability 
in ASEAN 






Prior to the Bali 
Concord II (2003) 
High Low Low 
After the Bali 
Concord II (2003) 










This thesis has examined three factors—the type of security challenges, the 
defense capability, and the ability to avoid intramural conflicts— that have shaped 
ASEAN’s approach to defense cooperation since its foundation in 1967 in order to 
explain why the members decided in 2003 to enhance defense cooperation under the 
APSC arrangement. The question stemmed from an observation that, during its first three 
decades, ASEAN members rejected any idea to establish multilateral military cooperation 
among themselves, but in 2003, their leaders reversed this policy and agreed to pursue 
multilateral defense cooperation. This thesis concludes that each of the three factors 
influenced the members of ASEAN in deciding either to adopt or reject multilateral 
defense cooperation within ASEAN. These factors had different effects depending on the 
circumstances the members faced. 
Since it was founded in the Cold War era, ASEAN encountered traditional threats 
that came from internal turbulence caused by communist rebellions and separatist 
movements and intramural conflicts, such as the Cambodian conflict, and some territorial 
disputes involving the military forces (e.g., between Indonesia and Malaysia and between 
Thailand and Cambodia). To deal with the internal security challenges, ASEAN leaders 
shared the same perception that these challenges should be dealt with domestically since 
they fell under the sovereign jurisdiction of each country. Therefore, security or defense 
cooperation among members to overcome domestic security challenges was out of the 
question. 
In addition, Southeast Asian countries experienced the impact of the Cold War 
circumstances, which brought them into the rivalries of superpowers and created external 
security challenges. The Cold War exaggerated the fear of the growing communist 
influence related to communist rebellion activities, which were supported by China. 
Additionally, most ASEAN members worried about Thailand’s security after Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia, which was backed by the Soviet Union. To address the intramural 
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and also the external security challenges, ASEAN leaders decided to manage the conflict 
through a diplomatic settlement. To prevent further military conflicts, ASEAN actively 
engaged the conflicting countries to meet at a negotiation table.  
Although military support was one of the options available to address traditional 
security challenges, ASEAN recognized that this approach was irrelevant since the 
members had very small military forces during the Cold War. In addition to the lack of 
force projection capability, most countries in the region still had to deal with internal 
threats and economic hardship. Hence, providing military assistance, either individually 
or collectively, to another member that was under military threat was not a viable 
solution.  
The demise of the Cold War led Southeast Asia into another uncertain external 
security environment since the emergence of regional great powers like Japan and China 
wanted to increase their influence in the region after the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet 
military forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S. departure from the region 
left room for the regional great powers to expand and strengthen their influence. The 
intention of Japan and China could have started a new power competition. ASEAN 
leaders saw that this development would again challenge the association’s cohesiveness 
and goals to promote peace and stability in the region. Therefore, ASEAN required a 
strategy to work toward this goal, and thus the ARF was established. This forum was 
created only to conduct security dialogues and enmesh the major powers to prevent them 
from further hostile actions that could jeopardize regional security. However, starting at 
this point, ASEAN defense multilateralism significantly intensified. 
Furthermore, with the increase of economic development and interconnectedness 
among regional and global countries, non-traditional security threats such as piracy and 
armed robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, contagious diseases, human rights 
violence, natural disasters, and so on, have become a major concern for the countries in 
Southeast Asia. To address these challenges, numerous multilateral defense cooperation 
frameworks have been established such as the MSSP, intelligence sharing, and a number 
of defense officials’ meetings; these are, however, outside the ASEAN framework. 
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Looking at the development of non-traditional security challenges and the 
increase of security and defense cooperation, ASEAN leaders decided to institutionalize 
multilateral defense cooperation into the association. They were aware that multilateral 
defense cooperation became more important to address transnational security challenges. 
The establishment of the ADMM in 2006 and the ADMM-Plus in 2010 exemplified this 
policy change. Both meetings provide opportunities for members and external actors to 
participate in achieving ASEAN goals in support of the establishment of the APSC. This 
initiative started in 2003 when leaders of ASEAN agreed to create an ASEAN 
Community in 2020, which was mandated by the Bali Concord II, and the APSC was one 
of its three pillars. Under the political-security community, enhancing the defense 
cooperation is one of the areas to be realized to achieve the goals of the ASEAN 
Community. 
The ADMM and the ADMM-Plus also demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to 
promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia through concrete actions. The ADMM 
incorporates some of the existing multilateral defense cooperation outside the ASEAN 
framework, particularly high officials’ meetings. Moreover, both meetings have taken the 
non-traditional security challenges as their primary focus to implement practical defense 
engagements. The ADMM’s current areas of cooperation are HA/DR, peacekeeping 
operations, and the defense industry; and the ADMM-Plus focuses on maritime security, 
counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping 
operations, military medicine, and humanitarian mine action. This development shows 
that the increase of non-traditional security threats has become the primary driving factor 
for the establishment and expansion of multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN. Also, 
enhancing defense cooperation in ASEAN indicates that the association has reached 
another important step in its endeavor to accomplish one of its goals: to promote and 
maintain stability in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, focusing ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation on the non-
traditional security challenges allows more room for members to contribute. In contrast to 
addressing traditional threats, members’ existing military capabilities are arguably 
sufficient to encounter the non-traditional security issues. Having obtained significant 
 60 
economic growth, most ASEAN members have been able to develop their defense 
capabilities and handle the internal security threats posed by separatist movements. Yet, 
the countries need to work together because the challenges are difficult to overcome by 
an individual state. 
In addition, having engaged in intense and increased bilateral defense cooperation 
such as border security cooperation, intelligence exchange, and exercises and trainings, 
ASEAN leaders have seen that these kinds of cooperation have produced some benefits. 
High-ranking defense officials have regularly met in conferences, meetings, and 
dialogues such as the AACC (ASEAN Air Forces Conference), the ACDFIM (ASEAN 
Chiefs of Defence Forces’ Meeting), the ACNM (ASEAN Chiefs of Navies’ Meeting), 
and the ACAMM (ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting) to discuss specific 
security and defense issues in the region and produce constructive ideas to address the 
problems. In a practical context, the troops and military assets have been involved and 
engaged in periodic training and exercises. These have provided opportunities for lower 
level military commanders and personnel to build better understandings and enhance 
inter-operability in conducting future real missions. By engaging in exercises and 
trainings, they can produce and evaluate standard operating procedures for a future joint 
operation, for example the SASOP for HA/DR operations. Through these various, intense 
military engagements, the region’s countries have built confidence and trust among them. 
Endorsing multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN also provides another 
opportunity to enhance the association’s ability to prevent intramural conflicts. This 
benefit also comes from the confidence-building measures that have been achieved 
through intense defense interactions. Additionally, ASEAN members use the non-
traditional security challenges as another common interest to find peaceful forms of 
conflict prevention. Although the source of non-traditional threats may come from 
specific members, for instance, the haze from Indonesia and terrorism from the 
Philippines and Indonesia, evidence shows that these problems did not provoke conflicts 
with neighboring countries. Moreover, the countries in the region have been able to find 
solutions to prevent and mitigate through multilateral arrangements such as the ACPTP 
(ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution). 
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To conclude, the nature of the security challenges, defense capability, and ability 
to find peaceful conflict resolution have shaped ASEAN members’ policies toward 
multilateral defense cooperation. In the past, the members faced non-traditional threats 
and had relatively weak defense capabilities to address those security challenges. In 
addition, the level of trust among members was still low. These circumstances led the 
members of association to establish bilateral rather than multilateral defense cooperation.  
Over time, as the three factors have changed, ASEAN leaders have agreed to 
endorse multilateral defense cooperation under the association mechanism. The non-
traditional security threats have emerged and become prevalent. Defense capabilities 
have increased and have become adequate to deal with the threats. After having engaged 
in intense interactions, the members have built a considerable level of trust with one 
another, through which they can prevent conflicts that come from existing disputes or 
from transnational issues. The members of ASEAN have seen that these circumstances 
have given them opportunities to institutionalize defense cooperation into a multilateral 
scope. They have realized that multilateral defense cooperation will accelerate the 
achievement of ASEAN goals. 
B. WAY AHEAD 
Although ASEAN has survived and obtained significant achievements toward 
reaching its goals, the dynamic of the security environment in Southeast Asia always 
brings new challenges to the organization, such as the non-traditional threats. These 
motivate ASEAN to continue its efforts to seek comprehensive strategies to address the 
challenges. In doing so, defense cooperation is one of the means available to ASEAN. 
After rejecting the development of multilateral defense cooperation in the early decades 
of ASEAN, ASEAN leaders agreed to enhance defense cooperation under the APSC. 
Mandated by the Bali Concord II, this initiative reflected ASEAN’s first commitment to 
pursue multilateral defense cooperation within the association. Subsequently, the 
members have developed the idea into more practical implementation, namely the 
ADMM and the ADMM-Plus. 
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As multilateral defense cooperation has successfully been established, ASEAN 
members arguably have removed the most difficult barrier to complete the regional 
organization’s aims to bolster and materialize the three pillars of the ASEAN 
Community. Although the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus still have a long way to go to 
achieve its goals, ASEAN has created more opportunities and wide room for other areas 
of cooperation. The increased number of expert working groups in both meetings 
indicates that the ASEAN members’ commitment to enhance multilateral defense 
cooperation is growing. Although critics still question its role in solving regional 
problems, ASEAN’s decision to enhance defense cooperation through the ADMM and 
the ADMM-Plus proves that the organization has achieved important momentum toward 
reaching its goals. The association has effectively used non-traditional security issues as a 
common interest to enhance ASEAN defense cooperation. 
While members’ growing concern about non-traditional security threats has 
driven the institutionalization of multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN, the 
association still has to find a solution to the existing turbulence around the South China 
Sea disputes. This issue could have several possible impacts on regional stability. 
Although ASEAN has actively attempted to negotiate the implementation of the Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea, China still maintains its resistance to the proposal and 
continues its assertiveness, combined with its military presences in the dispute areas. This 
unilateral move has prompted strong reactions from other claimants that also have 
deployed and conducted naval patrols in their claimed territories. This situation might 
trigger armed skirmishes and endanger maritime activities in the region. Moreover, to 
balance China’s power, some claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam still expect 
U.S. involvement in the negotiation. This individual initiative might regenerate power 
rivalry in the region, which has been avoided by ASEAN. 
By establishing the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has tried again to enmesh some major 
powers in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, to prevent the negative impacts of the 
South China Sea territorial conflicts. The member countries expect that engaging China 
through the meeting might give them wider room to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the 
issue. Continuous interactions with China’s defense officials might become a bridge to, at 
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least, reduce China’s move and prevent armed conflicts. To achieve this goal, ASEAN 
should continue developing its defense cooperation through the ADMM and the ADMM-
Plus to address non-traditional threats. In addition, the meetings should strengthen their 
respective areas of cooperation and possibly enhance the number of existing working 
groups to deal with other non-traditional security issues. 
Nevertheless, the commitment to enhance ASEAN multilateral defense 
cooperation by focusing on the non-traditional security threats will be questioned if the 
South China Sea issue escalates and becomes a military conflict triggered by China’s 
growing assertiveness. The worst scenario is that China declares its sovereignty claims in 
the region by deploying military forces in all disputed territories. The existing ASEAN 
multilateral defense cooperation has not been designed to mitigate the impacts of armed 
conflicts by providing military support to members that are involved in conflicts. The 
primary objective of the ASEAN defense cooperation framework is to promote peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia by preventing conflicts through dialogue and defense 
cooperation or by conducting defense diplomacy. Therefore, if war occurs between China 
and other claimants in the South China Sea, the established defense cooperation will not 
be ready to address this traditional threat. Similarly, although members’ defense 
capabilities have significantly developed, the possibility of providing military support to 
members involved in the conflict is still unlikely. In addition, this also indicates that 
ASEAN’s conflict prevention mechanism arguably has failed. 
Furthermore, as a comprehensive security organization, sovereignty is the primary 
consideration of ASEAN members, ahead of committing to any multilateral cooperation. 
The presence of traditional security challenges, such as armed conflict in the South China 
Sea, may change members’ policies toward the established multilateral defense 
cooperation. Most likely, some countries would again try to seek security assistance from 
major powers to balance China. If that happens, the legacy of the power rivalry will most 
likely be reborn in Southeast Asia. In short, traditional security challenges remain the 
primary driving force that can change the security environment in Southeast Asia and 
affect the existing ASEAN’s multilateral defense cooperation. 
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